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INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION: BRINGING AN
"OTHERWISE" VALID CAUSE OF ACTION INTO
THE 21ST CENTURY
The malicious ingenuity of mankind is constantly producing new
inventions in the art of disturbing their neighbors. To this inven-
tion must be opposed general principles, calculated to meet and
punish them.'
I. INTRODUCrION
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis introduced
America's jurisprudence to the notion of the "right to privacy."2 In so
doing, they also pointed out the dangers of "numerous mechanical de-
vices [that] threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."'3  Although
courts have been mindful of this prediction, and have tried to anticipate
the coming of these devices,4 our nation's privacy jurisprudence is strug-
gling to keep pace with technology.
The vast majority of cases dealing with the privacy implications of
modem surveillance technologies have arisen in the context of fourth
amendment search and seizure law. The common law, on the other
hand, has had little opportunity to address such issues. One reason for
this may be, as Justice Powell observed, dissenting in Dow Chemical Co.
v. U.S.,6 that "members of the public" are not likely to use such surveil-
lance equipment because of the cost But based on the competitive
1. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277,281 (Pa. 1812).
2. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
3. Id. at 195 (source of internal quotation not cited in original).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J. dissenting)
(pondering the Fourth Amendment ramifications "if a device were developed that, when
aimed at a person, would detect instantaneously whether the person is carrying cocaine...
[or] that could detect, from the outside of a building, the presence of cocaine inside.").
5. See generally, Merrick D. Bernstein, "Intimate Details": A Troubling New Fourth
Amendment Standard for Government Surveillance Techniques, 46 DUKE LJ. 575 (1996)
(citing and discussing cases dealing with the fourth amendment implications of such modern
surveillance techniques as satellite photography and thermographic imaging).
6. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
7. Id. at 251 n.13. The particular surveillance technology at issue in Dow was a sophisti-
cated "mapping camera" mounted to an airplane. Id. at 242. The cost of the camera was ap-
proximately $22,000. Id. at n.4.
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market that exists today for such technology, this reasoning seems sus-
pect. However, there is another more likely explanation for this dispar-
ity: criminal defendants know they have been surveyed-because that is
what usually leads to their arrest-and can, therefore, complain of it.
One of the more insidious aspects of modem surveillance technology
is its passivity. Those who do not know that they are being spied on
cannot complain of it. Furthermore, even if they do learn of it, the
common law remedy for such an invasion, intrusion upon seclusion, may
not be prepared to deal with the technology involved.
Intrusion upon seclusion has long been the problem child of tort law.
Ever since its birth in 1960,9 courts have struggled to strike a balance be-
tween protecting an individual's seclusion and protecting "the freedom
of action and expression of those who threaten the seclusion of others."'1
To this end, the tort has limited its protection of privacy interests by re-
quiring that a plaintiff show the following: (1) that he or she had an ac-
tual expectation of privacy and that such expectation was objectively
reasonable;" and (2) that the intrusion into this private sphere was
highly offensive. 2 Modern technology, however, makes this difficult in a
number of ways.
First, some technologies are capable of divining information from
facts and conditions which people broadcast unknowingly." As such, it
can be argued that there is no actual expectation of privacy in such in-
formation. Additionally, some technologies are capable of legitimately
gathering private information in such an unobtrusive way that it is hard
to categorize it as "highly offensive." As a result, many intrusion victims
will have a difficult task in meeting their burden of proof. If these in-
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). "One who inten-
tionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his pri-
vate affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the in-
trusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977).
10. PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995) (quoting 2 FOWLER
V. HARPER ET. AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 9.6, at 636 (2d ed. 1986)).
11. See Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d at 1279; N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729,
732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); Prosser, supra note 9, at 391-92.
12. See, e.g., Miller v. National Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986).
The Court in Miller laid out the following factors when determining the offensiveness of an
intrusion: "the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the
intrusion as well as the intruder's motive and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes,
and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded." Id. at 679. See also, W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 855 (5th ed. 1984).
13. See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of such devices.
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consistencies are not addressed, modern technology will eviscerate
many objectively reasonable expectations of privacy.14
That the unique issues raised by technological surveillance devices
are currently beyond the intrusion tort's ken is apparent from the Re-
statement's crude categorization of the forms of intrusion as "physically
or otherwise." This Comment posits that a better reasoned conceptual
framework would more precisely delineate the actionable forms of in-
trusion, especially with respect to those non-physical forms of intrusion
committed by the use of the senses. Any meaningful reconception in
this regard, however, must be premised on an understanding of the na-
ture of sensory intrusion in general.
Part II of this Comment will explore the development of the intru-
sion tort-from its conception one stormy night in Michigan to its incor-
poration into the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Part III discusses that
category of intrusions based solely on the use of the senses. It begins by
explaining the distinction between "appreciating" and "discerning" with
the senses. This section goes on to show how the tort of intrusion has
recognized this distinction, and how technology has expanded and col-
lapsed this distinction. Finally, Part IV of this Comment will consider
the application of the intrusion tort to claims of intrusion by technologi-
cal means, both real and academic.
II. INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION: A BIOGRAPHY
A. Conception
It was a dark and stormy night." Dr. DeMay, a physician, had been
summoned to visit one.Mrs. Roberts, who was expected to give birth at
any time. Unfortunately, the roads to her house were so bad that no
horse could traverse them."6 Dr. DeMay, sick and fatigued from over-
work, urgently requested a young man named Scattergood to assist him
by carrying a lantern, an umbrella, and certain medical equipment.
Scattergood-who was unmarried and had no medical training-was
reluctant to go but eventually agreed.17
14. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and
What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1173 (1998) ("There are more ways to
conduct surveillance than ever before.... This new technology therefore gives the media the
power to invade privacy in ways that current [intrusion] doctrine does not fully apprehend.").
15. DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
16. See idL at 146-47.
17. See iL
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Upon arriving at Mrs. Roberts' house, Dr. DeMay knocked on the
door and was met by her husband. The doctor told Mr. Roberts that he
had brought "a friend along to help carry [his] things."'" Mr. Roberts,
assuming that Scattergood was either a physician or medical student,
was satisfied with Dr. DeMay's recommendation and invited the men to
enter.'9
When it came time for Mrs. Roberts to give birth, Scattergood sat in
a corner and faced a wall.o However, Dr. DeMay soon ordered Scatter-
good to assist him by holding Mrs. Roberts' hand during a particularly
pronounced paroxysm of parturient pain.2' Though Scattergood's assis-
tance was brief, and the child was born without incident, Mr. and Mrs.
Roberts were mortified when they later learned the true character of
Dr. DeMay's companion. Demanding satisfaction for this deceit, they
brought suit against Dr. DeMay and Scattergood."
The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a judgment in favor of the
couple but did not specify the precise ground for recovery.2' Although
trespass and battery were certainly good candidates,24 the court seemed
to take particular issue with Scattergood's act of bearing witness to
something he should not have, holding:
To the plaintiff, the occasion was a most sacred one and no one
had a right to intrude unless invited or because of some real and
pressing necessity which it is not pretended existed in this case.
The plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at
such a time, and the law secures to her this right by requiring
1& DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 147 (Mich. 1881).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 148.
21. See id. Originally, Mrs. Roberts was being tended to by her husband, Dr. DeMay,
and one Mrs. Parks. However, during the pains of labor, Mrs. Roberts kicked Mrs. Parks in
the stomach, forcing her to go outside for the air. While Mrs. Parks was away, Mrs. Roberts
began thrashing, at which point Dr. DeMay told Scattergood to "catch her." Id.
22. See id. at 149.
23. See id. The court simply stated that "both parties [DeMay and Scattergood] were
guilty of deceit, and the wrong thus done entitles the injured party to recover the damages
afterwards sustained, from shame and mortification upon discovering the true character of
the defendants." Id.
24. See id. at 146. The court began its decision by indicating that Dr. DeMay "intending
to deceive [Mrs. Roberts] wrongfully, etc., introduced and caused to be present at the house.
. the said Scattergood .... " Id. Likewise, the court indicated that "the defendant Scatter-
good ... indecently, wrongfully and unlawfully laid hands upon and assaulted [Mrs. Roberts].
... " IL
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others to observe it, and abstain from its violation. 2
And thus, on that dark and stormy night, a new cause of action was
conceived.'
B. Birth
In 1960, Dean William Prosser undertook an analysis of the law of
privacy, as it had developed in legal writing and case law.2 Prosser con-
cluded that invasion df privacy was not one tort, but a complex of four.?
He described these four distinct torts as follows: (1) intrusion upon a
plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public dis-
closure of embarrassing private facts about a plaintiff; (3) publicity
which places a plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appro-
priation, for a defendant's advantage, of a plaintiff's name or likeness.!9
Prosser divined the tort of intrusion-ex post-from the case of
DeMay v. Robert? and numerous other cases in which there was some
form of wrongful search or surveillance.1  From an analysis of these
cases, he distilled three prerequisites for maintaining a successful intru-
sion action: (1) "there must be something in the nature of prying or in-
trusion"; (2) "the thing into which there is prying or intrusion must be,
25. Id. at 149.
26. For an example of how the DeMay case would turn out today, see Knight v. Penob-
scot Bay Medical Center, 420 A.2d 915 (Me. 1980). In the Knight case, the supreme court of
Maine applied the Restatement definition of intrusion upon seclusion to a fact pattern
roughly analogous to that in DeMay. In so doing, the court upheld a jury verdict for the de-
fendant on the ground that the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant had no intent to
intrude. See id.
27. See Prosser, supra note 9, at 388-89 ("It is only in recent years, and largely through
the legal writers, that there has been any attempt to inquire what interests are we protecting,
and against what conduct. Today with something over three hundred cases in the books, the
holes in the jigsaw puzzle have been largely filled in, and some rather definite conclusions are
possible.").
28. See id. at 389.
29. See id. Prosser emphasized that these were four distinct kinds of invasions of four
different interests of a plaintiff. Despite their common name-invasion of privacy-they have
almost nothing in common. See id.
30. 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
31. See Prosser, supra note 9, at 389-90. Prosser observed that there were two types of
intrusions: physical (which overlapped trespass to land or chattels) and non-physical (encom-
passing eavesdropping by means of wire tapping and microphones and peering into the win-
dows of a home). See id. at 390.
32. Id. at 390 (observing that mere noises, bad manners, harsh names, and insulting ges-
tures are not sufficient).
1999]
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and be entitled to be, private";33 and (3) "the intrusion must be some-
thing which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man."'
C. Baptism
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, of which Dean Prosser served
as Reporter until June, 1970, incorporated the tort of "intrusion upon
seclusion."3  The Restatement's definition, which has since been
adopted by the vast majority of American jurisdictions, echoes the pre-
requisites articulated by Dean Prosser earlier, providing: "One who in-
tentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclu-
sion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person."36 Comment (b) to the Restatement ex-
plicates the definition of intrusion by distinguishing those intrusions de-
scribed as "physical" and those lumped together as "otherwise."3
'
A "physical" intrusion is one which involves some trespass to land.8
The DeMay case is an example of such an intrusion.39 On the other
33. Id at 391-92. (observing that it is not an invasion of privacy to do no more than fol-
low a plaintiff about in public. Likewise, it is no invasion of privacy to take the plaintiff's
photograph in public, because it amounts to nothing more than making a record of a public
sight which any one present would be free to see). An astute scholar of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence should instantly recognize the similarity between Prosser's two-part privacy
requirement and the two-prong "expectation of privacy" analysis articulated by Justice
Harlan, seven years later, concurring in Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
34. Prosser, supra note 9, at 390-91.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id at cmt. b.
39. See discussion supra Part II.A. The Restatement's illustration of such an intrusion
presents the scenario of a newspaper reporter who sought to interview a woman in the hospi-
tal with a rare disease. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 1 (1977).
The reporter was denied an interview, but showed up at the woman's hospital room anyway
and took her picture - over the woman's objection. See id The Restatement concluded that
this action constituted an invasion of privacy. See id. Today, however, these kinds of cases
generally arise in the context of trespass by deceit, rather than overt, forcible entry. See, e.g.,
Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (Trespass action brought
against television network for.engaging in undercover investigation of the plaintiff's business
on the theory of consent obtained by fraud; citing numerous intrusion upon seclusion cases);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (Intrusion action brought by practitio-
ner of "simple quackery" against magazine reporters who did an undercover investigation of
his home "medical" practice; premised on the trespatory nature of the surreptitious introduc-
tion of recording devices); Miller v. National Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986)
(Intrusion action brought against television camera crew who accompanied paramedics into
plaintiff's home and recorded efforts to rescue plaintiffs husband, who was having a heart
attack; camera crew's defense of First Amendment privilege to enter rejected).
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hand, those intrusions lumped together under the broad appellation
"otherwise" appear to fall into three separate categories: (1) those in-
volving some trespass to chattels;4 (2) those involving a purely sensory
invasion; and (3) those involving some sort of harassment.4 In recent
years, however, there have been numerous attempts to include informa-
tion gathering and dissemination as a form of intrusion upon seclu-
sion 43-no doubt in response to the exponential growth of the informa-
tion industry in this computerized age." However, only recently has a
plaintiff alleging intrusion through information gathering succeeded in
court.45 As such, the viability of such a species of intrusion is speculative
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). Comment (b) cites
the following examples: "opening [a plaintiffs] private and personal mail, searching his safe
or his wallet, examining his private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order
to permit an inspection of his personal documents." Id
41. See id. Comment (b) observes that an intrusion may be committed "by the use of the
defendant's senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's pri-
vate affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars .. " Id. The Comment
also makes reference to the use of wiretapping. See id. However, because surreptitious re-
cording devices generally require that some sort of technical trespass to land or chattels be
committed, through either their installation or introduction, they are more properly viewed as
belonging to that category of intrusions involving a trespass. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W
Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 492 (Cal. 1998) (analogizing mechanical recording devices to an
"unannounced second auditor" in concluding that a reporter's act of attaching a microphone
to a paramedic might constitute an actionable intrusion upon seclusion).
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b illus. 5 (1977) ("A... tele-
phones B ... every day for a month, insisting that [B] come to his [A's] studio and be photo-
graphed. The calls are made at meal times, late at night and at other inconvenient times, and
A ignores B's requests to desist. A has invaded B's privacy."). See also Tompkins v. Cyr, 995
F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (abortion protestors held liable for intrusion upon seclusion
where they conspicuously shadowed an abortion doctor, made repeated and harassing phone
calls to his home, and used a bull-horn to preach at demonstrations held outside the doctor's
home); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) (Title VII sex-
ual harassment claimant could also sustain an action for intrusion upon seclusion against her
employer based on the employer's "intrusive and coercive sexual demands" and "improper
inquiries into [the claimant's] sexual proclivities and personality.").
43. See, e.g., Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213 (D.C. 1989) (rejecting intrusion action
brought by an attorney against a magazine alleging the garnering of information from third
parties and the culling of facts from public records); Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652
N.E.2d 1351 (Il. App. Ct. 1995) (American Express cardholders brought intrusion action
against American Express alleging that American Express's practice of categorizing card-
holder spending behavior and then renting this information to participating merchants consti-
tuted an intrusion; court rejected claimants' theory); Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337
(Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting claimant's intrusion theory in action brought to enjoin pub-
lishers and credit card company from selling subscription lists to direct mail advertisers).
44. For a discussion of the modem information industry, and the danger it poses to per-
sonal privacy, see Sandra Byrd Petersen, Note, Your Life as an Open Book- Has Technology
Rendered Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED. COMM. L. J. 163 (1995).
45. See Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 971 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1997)
1999]
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at best.46 In any event, it is the category of purely sensory invasions with
which this Comment is primarily concerned.
III. PURELY SENSORY INVASIONS AND THE RISE OF HIGH-TECH
SURVEILLANCE DEVICES
A. "Appreciating" v. "Discerning"
People unknowingly broadcast volumes of personal information to
the public just by making themselves visible. No one knew this better
than Sherlock Holmes.47 Just by looking at a person, Sherlock Holmes
could tell where a person had been and what he had been doing-even
though he had never seen the person before.4' Likewise, Holmes could
deduce a great deal about a person from simply examining his personal
effects-such as a hat,'4 watch,'° or pipe.5' He could even read a person's
(holding that claimant made a prima facie case for intrusion against the First Lady, Hillary
Clinton, and others based on the gathering of personal information about the claimant from
FBI files, distinguishing Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213 (D.C. 1989)).
46. Cf. Petersen, supra note 44, at 176 (arguing that the tort of intrusion is unhelpful in
protecting privacy from the gathering and dissemination of information in light of: (1) the
tort's historic application as a gap-filler for trespass law; and (2) the difficulty in assessing the
offensiveness of such an intrusion).
47. The legendary detective Sherlock Holmes is, of course, merely a product of Arthur
Conan Doyle's imagination. Sherlock Holmes first appeared in A Study in Scarlet, published
in Beeton's Christmas Annual for 1887. See S.C. ROBERTS, INTRODUCTION TO ARTHUR
CONAN DOYLE, SHERLOCK HOLMES: SELECTED STORIES vii, viii (Oxford University Press
1990). However, as he has taken on a life of his own in popular media over the years, he is
sufficiently "real" for the purposes of illustrating amorphous legal concepts. See Leslie A.
Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIs. L. REv. 429, 434 (ob-
serving that a character such as Sherlock Holmes "may live in the public imagination, beyond
the reach of any individual work").
48. For example, in the case of The Red-Headed League, Holmes deduced, after a cur-
sory glance, that his new client "ha[d] at some time done manual labour, that he [took] snuff,
that he [was] a Freemason, that he [had] been in China, and that he [had] done a considerable
amount of writing ...." ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SHERLOCK HOLMES: SELEcTED STORIES
331 (1990).
49. From The Blue Carbuncle:
That the man was highly intellectual is of course obvious upon the face of it, and also
that he was fairly well-to-do within the last three years, although he has now fallen
upon evil days. He had foresight, but has less now than formerly, pointing to a
moral retrogression, which, when taken with the decline of his fortunes, seems to in-
dicate some evil influence, probably drink, at work upon him. This may account also
for the obvious fact that his wife has ceased to love him.... He has, however, re-
tained some degree of self-respect.... He is a man who leads a sedentary life, goes
out little, is out of training entirely, is middle-aged, has grizzled hair which he has
had cut within the last few days, and which he anoints with lime-cream. These are
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mind by looking at his face 2
Holmes' hapless sidekick, Dr. Watson, dumbstruck at the seemingly
psychic nature of Holmes' deductive prowess, once remarked:
When I hear you give your reasons.... the thing always appears
to me to be so ridiculously simple that I could easily do it myself,
though at each successive instance of your reasoning I am baf-
fled, until you explain your process. And yet I believe that my
eyes are as good as yours.3
Holmes conceded that his own vision was not extraordinary, and
then replied, "You see, but you do not observe. The distinction is
clear." 'A
In order to illustrate for Dr. Watson the difference between "seeing"
and "observing," Sherlock Holmes engaged in the following examina-
tion:
Holmes: "For example, you have frequently seen the steps which
lead up from the hall to this room."
Watson: "Frequently."
Holmes: "How often?"
Watson: "Well, some hundreds of times."
the more patent facts which are to be deduced from his hat. Also, by the way, that it
is extremely improbable that he has gas laid on in his house.
Id. at 282-83.
50. From The Sign of Four. "He was a man of untidy habits-very untidy and careless.
He was left with good prospects, but he threw away his chances, lived for some time in pov-
erty with occasional short intervals of prosperity, and, finally, taking to drink, he died. That is
all I can gather." DOYLE, supra note 49, at 74.
51. From The Yellow Face: "The owner is obviously a muscular man, left-handed, with
an excellent set of teeth, careless in his habits, and with no need to practise economy." 3
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 31 (1904).
52. From The Resident Patient.
Watson: "Do you mean to say that you read my train of thoughts from my fea-
tures?"
Holmes: "Your features, and especially your eyes.... It was very superficial, my
dear Watson, I assure you."
DOYLE, supra note 49, at 159-60.
53. DOYLE, supra note 49, at 209.
54. Id.
1999]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Holmes: "Then how many are there?"
Watson: "How many? I don't know."
Holmes: "Quite so! You have not observed. And yet you have
seen. That is just my point. Now, I know that there are seven-
teen steps, because I have both seen and observed."55
The distinction to which Holmes is alluding applies to all five senses.
It is the distinction between "appreciating" and "discerning." When one
"appreciates" something, he is fully aware of or sensitive to it.16 How-
ever, when one "discerns" something, he is actually perceiving or de-
tecting it from something else which he his appreciating.' In this re-
spect, appreciating is a purely physiological function, while discerning is
a combination of both physiology and cognition.
B. The Appreciating/Discerning Distinction in Intrusion
One general principle that can be gleaned from the Restatement
definition of intrusion, and the cases construing it, is that discerning
something is not an intrusion if the discerning individual is properly in a
position to appreciate it with his own senses. 8 The rationale behind this
principle is that it would "place too great a strain on human weakness"
to require a person to "play the nobler part and shut his [senses]" to
readily discernible facts. 9 Therefore, the law of intrusion only imposes
liability for the use of one's senses if that person is using them in a place
where he or she should not be. However, this general principle should
not be understood to mean that all things that transpire in public are fair
55. Doyle, supra note 49, at 209-10.
56. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 121 (2d ed. 1982) (defining "appreciate"
as "[t]o be fully aware of or sensitive to; realize").
57. Id. at 402 (defining "discern" as "[t]o perceive (something obscure or concealed);
detect.... To recognize or comprehend mentally.").
58. See, e.g., Schulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 491 (Cal. 1998) (holding
that journalist at accident scene "did not intrude into [a] zone of privacy merely by being pre-
sent at a place Where he could hear [] conversations with unaided ears."). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (There is no liability for observing a per-
son, or even taking his photograph, while he is walking on the public highway, because "he is
not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public eye."); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 855 & n.68 (5th ed.
1984) ("On the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no legal right to be
alone; and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him about and watch him
there.").
59. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701,705 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (declining to extend liability for
intrusion upon seclusion to the passive recipient of information known to have been gathered
through eavesdropping).
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game for inquiry.
In Nader v. General Motors,60 consumer advocate Ralph Nader
brought suit against General Motors, alleging that the car manufacturer
had "authorized and directed [its agents] to engage in a series of activi-
ties which... violated his right to privacy."'" Nader alleged, among
other things, that GM agents followed Nader into a bank and got "suffi-
ciently close to him to see the denomination of the bills he was with-
drawing from his account."62 In upholding this claim against GM's mo-
tion to dismiss, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that "the
mere observation of [Nader] in a public place [did] not amount to an in-
vasion of his privacy." But the court went on to hold that "under cer-
tain circumstances, surveillance may be so 'overzealous' as to render it
actionable.""'
Whether a purely sensory surveillance falls into the category of
"mere observation" or "overzealous," however, depends on the sur-
rounding circumstances.' If Nader were conspicuously attempting to
shield the bank transaction from prying eyes, and GM's agents moved
unreasonably close to Nader so as to defeat this attempt and discover
the amount of money he was withdrawing, it may be said that the agents
were no longer in a proper position to "appreciate" the transaction-be-
cause their being in that position, (i.e., breathing down Nader's neck)
was offensive. If GM's agents were not in a proper position to appreci-
ate Nader's banking transaction, then any attempt to "discern" it may be
an actionable intrusion.
The court in Nader established that "[a] person does not automati-
cally make public everything he does merely by being in a public
60. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
61. Id at 767. Specifically, Nader alleged that GM's agents: (1) interviewed his ac-
quaintances, "questioning them about, and casting aspersions upon his political, social, racial
and religious views; his integrity; his sexual proclivities and inclinations; and his.., personal
habits"; (2) "kept him under surveillance in public places for an unreasonable length of time";
(3) "caused him to be accosted by girls for the purpose of entrapping him into illicit relation-
ships"; (4) "made threatening, harassing and obnoxious telephone calls to him"; (5) "tapped
his telephone and eavesdropped, by means of mechanical and electronic equipment, on his
private conversations with others"; and (6) "conducted a 'continuing' and harassing investiga-
tion of him." Id (citations to Complaint omitted).
62. Id at 771.
63. Id
64. Id (citing Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701,704 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pinkerton Nat'l De-
tective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 132 S.E.2d 119 (1963)).
65. Id; see also McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 346 (Or. 1975) (holding
that surveillance of a workers compensation claimant by investigators is non-actionable "if
the surveillance is conducted in a reasonable and unobtrusive manner").
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place."6" Indeed, it is only when a person acts in such a way as to reveal
some fact to any casual viewer that it may be said that observation of
that fact is not an intrusion.67 Under this reasoning, Sherlock Holmes'
deductions about people would not be actionable intrusions-even
though the information he gathered was often more personal than that
at issue in Nader-because the facts he discerned were revealed (albeit
unwittingly) by the people themselves and were appreciable to any cas-
ual viewer. The fact that Holmes was not just any casual viewer, but an
exceptionally perceptive detective, makes no difference for the purposes
of determining his liability for intrusion-and herein lies the danger of
high-tech surveillance equipment.
C. The Technological Threat to Privacy: Collapsing the Distinction
Between Appreciating and Discerning
Today, there are a multitude of devices which are capable of ex-
panding and collapsing the notions of appreciating and discerning by
allowing their user to discern conditions beyond the appreciation of his
natural senses. These devices are best viewed as belonging to two dis-
tinct categories: (1) technologies that enhance our own natural senses;
and (2) artificial senses.69
1. Sensory Enhancement Devices
A sensory enhancement device is one that enables its user to see or
hear something that could be viewed or heard by our unaided senses but
66. Nader, 225 N.E.2d at 771. ("[T]he mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give
anyone the right to try to discover the amount of money he was withdrawing." Il). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c ("Even in a public place, however, there
may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not ex-
hibited to the public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion
upon these matters."). One commentator has posited that the current formulation of the tort
of intrusion does not extend protection to intrusions in public places, and that no case has
ever expressly held otherwise. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the
Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1085-
86 (1995). However, this commentator neither mentions nor cites the Nader case anywhere in
his article.
67. See Nader, 225 N.E.2d at 771.
68. See, e.g., supra notes 47-51.
69. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 383, 395
(1997) (noting that some courts, when dealing with the question of whether the use of sur-
veillance technology constitutes a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, "have distin-
guished between devices that 'improve' human senses and devices that 'replace' them.").
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for some impediment.70 These devices expand the effective ranges of a
person's ability to appreciate with his senses, allowing him to overcome
impediments that prevent him from discerning something. When such
devices are simply used to help a person overcome a physiological im-
pediment to appreciating things in the first instance, as in the case of
eyeglasses and hearing aides, they are very good things. However, when
such devices are used to overcome a fear of detection, or another's ef-
forts at seclusion, they become offensive.
7 1
A sensory enhancing device can be used for both proper and im-
proper purposes. For example, the same pair of binoculars that a ship's
captain uses for navigating can be used by a peeping-tom to watch
someone across the street changing his or her clothes. However, many
devices have been developed especially for surveillance purposes, and
are now available as a result of "the 'peace dividend' associated with the
end of the Cold War." And, for whatever reason, there is a burgeoning
marketplace for these goods?
2. Artificial Senses
A device is properly called an artificial sense when it is capable of
appreciating things that a person could never appreciate without it.74
Unlike sensory enhancement devices, which extend the user's ability to
appreciate, but leave it to the user to actually discern things for himself,
artificial senses both appreciate and discern conditions, and merely re-
port what has been discerned to the user. In this respect artificial senses
collapse the distinction between appreciating and discerning. One ex-
ample of an artificial sense would be the use of a dog to sniff out contra-
70. See id. at 396 (citing "fear of detection" as such an impediment).
71. See, e.g., Shoe-camera Peeping Tom Spied on 30 Women at CNE, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Sep. 8, 1996, at E8 ("Police said a camera had been hidden in a pouch and was
connected by wires to a pinpoint fibre-optic lens attached to the tip of a size 12 brogue. Po-
lice say the man stepped close to women and aimed the camera lens between their legs.").
72. Id. at 386. See also Thomas Investigative Publications, Inc., The Spy Exchange and
Security Center (visited Dec. 22,1998) <http'//www.pimall.com/nais/35cam.html> (Order form
for the Photosniper Surveillance 35mm Still Camera: "Besides the GREAT functions found
in this surveillance photography system, you'll also be owning a piece of KGB history. This
unit is direct from Russia, the same standard issues used by Russian KGB agents!").
73. See, ag., 007-Eleven (visited Dec. 22, 1998) <http:J/www.007eleven.com/index.htm>;
The Surveillance Team (visited Dec. 22, 1998) <http://www.i-spy.netlhome.htm>; Thomas In-
vestigative Publications, Inc., The Spy Exchange and Security Center (visited Dec. 22, 1998)
<http://wwvw.pimall.com/nais>. These sites offer the latest in high-tech surveillance equip-
ment at competitive prices.
74. See Slobogin, supra note 69, at 396.
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band."
The handler of a dog trained to sniff out contraband does not have
the ability to appreciate the scent of contraband himself, and, therefore,
cannot himself discern, or "smell," the contraband. The dog, on the
other hand, can appreciate the scent of contraband, and has been
trained to alert its handler when it smells it. Therefore, when the dog
alerts its handler that it smells contraband it is merely relaying what it
has discerned.
In recent years, a number of artificial electronic senses have been de-
veloped. While these electronic devices are far more sophisticated than
a trained dog, they too collapse the appreciating/discerning distinction in
much the same way.
a. Millivision
Millivision is a purely passive imaging device that can see the milli-
meter wave portion of the electromagnetic radiation that naturally radi-
ates from persons and objects with a temperature above absolute zero.76
The device's "internal image processing algorithms" then distinguishes
the emitting persons and objects based on the character of their emis-
sivity.' The device can then display an image of the objects discerned.7"
Because millimeter wave emissions can penetrate many common build-
ing materials, Milivision can also observe people within a room from
outside of that room.
79
b. Truster Software
Truster is a new lie-detecting software program which purports to
determine truthfulness by measuring the inaudible low-frequency waves
of the voice.Y° The theory is that, "[w]hen lying, the amount of blood in
75. See id. at 395 (citing United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985)).
76. See Reducing Gun Violence: Testimony to the Crime and Criminal Justice Subcom-
mittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. (1994) (Statement of Dr. G. Richard
Huguenin, Millitech Corporation), available at 1994 WL 14190555. "Millivision" is the trade-
name for Millitech Corporation's passive millimeter wave imager. The device is intended for
law enforcement application in the remote detection of weapons. See id.
77. Id.
78. See id. However, "[iun order to protect a persons right to privacy," the device can be
programmed to display a person's image only if a suspicious object is detected by the device's
internal image processing algorithms. Id.
79. See id. "The resulting 'live' video images of people will indicate their location, pos-
ture, and activity within a room." Id.
80. See Irene R. Prusher, A Sixth Sense About Who's Lying: A New Program Surrepti-
tiously Tests Voices on the Phone, NEWSDAY, Jan. 27, 1998, at C3.
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the vocal cords drops as a result of the stress, producing a distorted
sound wave.""' By using complex algorithms and a number of parame-
ters, the software can determine whether the stress in a person's voice is
caused by lying, excitement, exaggeration or an emotional conflict."
Unlike polygraph tests, which use electrodes to measure a subject's
physiological reaction to the stress of lying, the voice stress analysis of
the Truster program can be done without the subject's knowledge." The
test can be performed on live, recorded, or telephonic statements.84 The
creators claim that the software is eighty-five percent accurate in identi-
fying stress that is indicative of a lie."
c. Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Surveillance Technology
Transient electromagnetic pulse emanation surveillance technology
(TEMPEST) is the term that has been applied to devices capable of ob-
serving the output on computer monitors by reading and reconstructing
the electromagnetic signals that monitors emit." These devices, which
are purely passive,' can be built with relative ease and little cost,8 yet
the information they reveal could be invaluable. 9
IV. THE INTRUSION TORT'S RESPONSE TO HIGH-TECH INVASIONS OF
PRIVACY
Claims of intrusion based on the use of the natural senses require a
showing that the alleged intruder was somehow not in a proper position
to appreciate the thing claimed to have been intruded on--either be-
cause of some trespass or "overzealous" conduct. Modem surveillance
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See Prusher, supra note 80; Matt Richtel, Some Doubts on Lie Detection by Phone,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,1998, at D4.
84. See Prusher, supra note 80; Richtel, supra note 83.
85. See Richtel, supra note 83.
86. See Christopher J. Seline, Eavesdropping on the Compromising Emanations of Elec-
tronic Equipment: The Laws of England and the United States, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
359, 361; Sarah Ellerman, Rise of the Tempest (visited Dec. 22, 1998)
<http://www.thecodex.com/rise.html>; Frank Jones, Nowhere to Run... Nowhere to Hide....
The Vulnerability of CRTs, CPUs and peripherals to TEMPEST Monitoring in the Real World
(visited Dec. 22,1998) <httpJ/www.thecodex.com/cjtempest.html>.
87. See Jones, supra note 86.
88. See Seline, supra note 86, at 359 (estimating the minimum cost for a TEMPEST de-
vice at less than two-hundred dollars); Jones, supra note 86 (identifying the components nec-
essary to make a TEMPEST device at home).
89. See Jones, supra note 86 (identifying potential users of TEMPEST monitoring).
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technology, however, is capable of eliminating the need to trespass or
engage in "overzealous" conduct in order to appreciate and discern
things. This section examines how the tort of intrusion has been applied
in those instances where the intrusion claimed has been perpetrated un-
obtrusively by mechanical means.'
A. Intrusion Through the Use of Sensory Enhancement Devices
"That's him right there. Bedroom door, far right. See him?"
"You sure?"
"Blue shirt."
"All I see is a... (unintelligible)."
"See what we're talking about."
"The door."
"The white door on the other side now."
"On the right side of the house."
"See that door on the right side.., on the far right."
"Well, I got a great look at it."
"Pull up... now he's on the other side, see him?"
"All I see is..."
"Pan that shot."
"Binoculars."
"He's also got a badge on his belt."
"Yes he does."
"Sh, Sh."
"He's staring out the window."
"Yeah, I see her. Are you watching her?"
"They think this thing can hear every whisper."
"Yeah. (Laugh)."
"Look at him peaking out the window again, John. See him over
there?"
"Did you get the drapes closing then just now?"
"Yep."
"Good." 91
90. Because devices like wiretaps, microphonic "bugs," and hidden cameras generally
involve in their installation or introduction some sort of technical trespass-either to land or
chattels-they are not really "unobtrusive." Therefore cases addressing these devices are not
discussed.
91. Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1996). This conversation,
between the members of an Inside Edition news crew, was recorded by a microphone being
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February 18, 1996. It was a bright and sunny day in Jupiter, Florida,
but Nancy Wolfson and her children were indoors, huddled in her fa-
ther's living room with all the curtains drawn An Inside Edition news
crew, anchored on a public waterway fifty to sixty yards away, was care-
fully monitoring the home with binoculars, a television camera equipped
with zoom lenses, and a Sennheiser "shotgun mike," hoping to capture
the Wolfson family's activities on film and audio tape.93 Nancy felt like a
prisoner.'
Nancy and her husband, Richard, went to Florida to get away from
the reporters that lurked outside. The reporters were producing a story
on executive salaries at U.S. Healthcare. Earlier in the week, they had
followed the Wolfsons around in their home state of Pennsylvania, at-
tempting to get an "ambush interview. ' ' s This surveillance caused the
Wolfsons extreme concern because Nancy's father, Leonard Abramson,
the Chairman and C.E.O. of U.S. Healthcare, had recently received
anonymous threats targeted at him and his family." The security agents
Mr. Abramson had employed to guard the Wolfsons were also con-
cerned, and even mistook an ambush interview attempt for an at-
tempted ambush of a more violent natureY After this incident, the
Wolfson's filed a complaint against the reporters98 and left Pennsylvania,
employed by the crew to record conversations sixty yards away. See id at 1429. Accompa-
nying video footage shows that the crew was using binoculars and cameras with zoom lenses
to observe the occupants of a house. See id. at 1430.
92. See id. at 1428-29.
93. See id. at 1428. The Sennheiser MKH60 unidirectional microphone, a.k.a. "shotgun
mike," is capable of picking up conversations up to sixty yards away. See id. at 1424. In this
case, the "shotgun mike" was attached to a long stick called a "boom," in order to increase its
range. See id. at 1428. It was also equipped with a "wind screen" to reduce peripheral noise,
enhancing clarity. See hd.
94. See id. at 1431.
95. See id. at 1423-24. According to the defendant reporters, and their expert witness,
an "ambush interview" refers to "a confrontational, surprise interview with an unwilling sub-
ject, generally a person who has previously refused to be interviewed." Id at 1424. The T.V.
journalist approaches the subject surreptitiously with cameras and sound rolling and asks a
question calculated to embarrass the subject. See id.
96. See iL at 1422-23. The precise nature of these threats was not indicated in the rec-
ord of the case, but they raised serious concerns about the safety of Mr. Abramson and his
family. See id. at 1423.
97. See id. at 1425. On February 14th, 1996, one of the reporters followed Mrs. Wolfson
to work in a jeep with tinted windows. Mrs. Wolfson was also being followed by one of her
security guards. When her guard saw that she was being followed by the jeep, he "felt that
the family must have been being set up for kidnaping or murder or something." Id. He felt
that the danger was so imminent that he readied his weapon. See id.
98. See id. at 1415-16. The Wolfsons filed their complaint in the Montgomery County
Court of Common Pleas and the defendants removed the action to federal court the next day.
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seeking refuge at the Abramson family home in Florida. But refuge
would be brief-the Inside Edition crew followed two days later.9
The Abramson family home in Florida was in an exclusive commu-
nity called "Admiral's Cove," located on the Intracoastal Waterway, a
public boating "highway.""1 The rear of the Abramson home, described
as "nothing but windows," faced this waterway.'O However, boaters
were not permitted to cross a rope that divided the home from the pub-
lic waterway.'O The Inside Edition crew's boat was anchored just a few
feet from this rope.0 3 Because the Inside Edition crew's boat was on a
public waterway, the Wolfsons could not have them removed by po-
lice.1u
When the Wolfsons returned home, a hearing was held regarding
their request for injunctive relief. 5 The alleged invasion that the court
found to be "[o]ne of the more serious" was the reporters' attempts to
intercept and record conversations at the Abramson home with the
"shotgun mike," because the state of Florida, where the attempt was
made, had a statute criminalizing such conduct and allowing a civil cause
of action for its violation. 1°6 However, this was not the sole grounds for
The Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendants had engaged in "tortious stalking, har-
assment, trespass, intrusions upon seclusion and invasions of privacy." let at 1415.
99. Id. at 1428.
100. See id.
101. Id at 1428, 1429.
102. See id. at 1428.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1430-31. A deputy sheriff marine patrol from Palm Beach County ap-
proached the Inside Edition crew's boat in response to a call that the boat's occupants were
engaging in suspicious conduct. The following conversation, picked up by the shotgun mike,
transpired:
Police: "We thought that maybe people were videotaping boats and were going
to come back and break into some of them."
Boat: "No, no we are a television news crew and we are not here for any illegal
purpose. We have been told and, of course we'll stay out of the area that's
marked no trespassing. Otherwise, our intentions are to spend a day and
soak up some sun and keep an eye on the place."
Police: "Okay, not a problem."
It- at 1431.
105. See id. at 1416. The hearing on the complaint filed February 14th, 1996, was heard
on February 27th. However, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 15(b), the court permitted testimony at the
hearing concerning the defendants' conduct in Florida on the weekend of February 17th. See
id.
106. ld. at 1433-34 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN ch. 934).
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determining that use of the shotgun mike was a likely intrusion. The
court found further that the use of the "shotgun mike" was "a significant
part of [a] harassing course of conduct... which greatly intruded upon
the solitude and privacy of [the Wolfsons]."' '
Based on what the court found to be a "reasonable likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of [the Wolfson's] claim for invasion of privacy based
on intrusion upon seclusion," a preliminary injunction was issued." The
court order enjoined the Inside Edition crew from "engaging in conduct,
with or without the use of cameras and sound equipment, which invades
the privacy of [the Wolfsons] ... until such time as the jury demanded
by the parties shall return a verdict on the merits."'  The Wolfsons set-
tled their suit on January 24, 1997.10
Although the Wolfson case involved a unique intrusion in terms of
the method employed-the use of a shotgun mike-the decision to hold
the reporters liable for this act was not at all surprising, for two reasons:
(1) the intrusive act, while committed in public, was directly targeted at
the most protected area of privacy-the home; and (2) the intruders
were anything but unobtrusive. But what if the use of a sensory en-
hancement device were targeted at something in public, and in a com-
pletely unobtrusive manner? Would that render the act non-actionable
as intrusion?
Suppose the Nader case had occurred today. If Mr. Nader had used
an outdoor ATM, instead of going inside a bank, and the alleged GM
agents had used a high-powered telescopic device to view what Mr.
Nader was doing from several yards away, instead of looking over his
shoulder, how could this still be an actionable intrusion? The Nader
court was quite clear in stating that "the mere observation of the plain-
tiff in a public place does not amount to an invasion of his privacy," and
only "overzealous" public surveillance may be actionable."' The court
found that getting unreasonably close to a person could constitute such
overzealousness, but in the telescope example there is no such physical
107. Id. at 1434.
108. L at 1432.
109. Id. at 1435.
110. See Associated Press, Settlement Reached in Lawsuit Against "Inside Edition"
(Monday, Jan. 27, 1997) (available at 1997 WL 4853649). The settlement included no pay-
ment, and did not restrict King World Productions, Inside Edition's producer, from rebroad-
casting the program featuring the Wolfsons, but the reporters agreed not to follow or go to
the home of the Wolfsons or certain family members. See id. King World's vice president
remarked, "This is an extremely positive outcome." Id.
111. Nader v. General Motors, 225 N.E.2d 765,771 (N.Y. 1970).
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proximity. Therefore, the only way to properly fix liability for such con-
duct would be to consider the use of the sensory enhancement device to
be the overzealous act. This was essentially the conclusion of Fifth Cir-
cuit in E.L duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher.
2
Christopher was an industrial espionage case wherein "an airplane
[was] the cloak and a camera the dagger.""' The defendants were pho-
tographers who were hired by an unknown third party to take aerial
photographs of construction taking place at one of DuPont's plants in
Texas."4 DuPont brought suit against the defendants alleging that they
had wrongfully obtained photographs revealing DuPont's trade secrets
and sold them to the undisclosed third party.1 5 Under Texas law, liabil-
ity for the disclosure of trade secrets only attached where such secrets
are discovered by "improper means."".6 The defendants contended that
their actions were not improper "because they conducted all of their ac-
tivities in public airspace, violated no government aviation standard, did
not breach any confidential relation, and did not engage in any fraudu-
lent or illegal conduct."" 7 However, the court of appeals disagreed.
Even though DuPont's facility was exposed to view from the air, the
court in Christopher found that DuPont had taken every reasonable step
to seclude their new facility from view."' In the court's view, it would be
unreasonable to require DuPont to build "an impenetrable fortress" to
"prevent nothing more than a school boy's trick."".9 As such, the court
concluded: "Perhaps ordinary fences and roofs must be built to shut out
incursive eyes, but we need not require the discoverer of a trade secret
to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the unprevent-
able methods of espionage now available."'"
While the precise value of an individual's interest in privacy is less
easy to ascertain than that of trade secrets, it is no less worthy of protec-
tion. As such, it would be most incongruent to require individuals to re-
pair themselves to some "impenetrable fortress" to protect this interest
in personal privacy when such extreme measures are not required to
preserve trade secret protection. The holding in Wolfson suggests that
112. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
113. Id at 1013.
114. See id.
115. See id at 1014.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1016.
119. Id at 1016-17.
120. Id. at 1016.
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courts may be starting to recognize this.12'
B. Intrusion Through the Use of Artificial Senses
Legal challenges to the use of artificial senses for surveillance pur-
poses have, thus far, arisen solely in Fourth Amendment contexts.' To
date, the question of civil liability for intrusion based on the use of arti-
ficial senses has only been addressed in the academic world. However,
an examination of this debate is quite insightful.
In 1993, the John Marshall National Moot Court Competition in In-
formation and Privacy Law considered the issue of whether the use of
TEMPEST equipment by the proprietor of a mail-order company to ob-
tain a copy of a competitor's customer lists could be actionable as an in-
trusion upon seclusion.'3 The fictional petitioner, "Longshore Cosmet-
ics," alleged that the fictional respondent, "Harry Hackner," used a
TEMPEST device'24 called "CRT Microspy" to receive the electromag-
netic radiation emanating from the video display terminal (VDT) of
Longshore's computer.2 Hackner was then able to reconstruct images
of what was displayed on Longshore's VDT, thereby allowing him to
121. But cf. Deteresa v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997). In
Deteresa, a woman brought an intrusion action against a television network and producer al-
leging that they surreptitiously recorded and videotaped a conversation she had with a re-
porter outsider her home and broadcast it-after she expressly refused to grant them an on-
air interview. See id. at 462-63. With respect to the videotaping, the court held that the plain-
tiff could not sustain an intrusion action because she was videotaped in public view, from a
public place, and there was no specific evidence that the plaintiff could only be seen with a
"high-powered lens." Id. at 466 & n3. However, citing the case of Aisenson v. American
Broad. Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Ct. App. 1990), the court in Deteresa seemed to suggest that,
even if the plaintiff could only have been seen by the reporters with a high-powered lens, such
intrusion would only be de minimus (and thus, non-actionable) where the plaintiff was other-
wise within public view. See id.
122. See generally Bernstein, supra note 5 (discussing the approach of America's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to thermographic imaging, and speculating about its likely re-
sponse to Millivision).
123. See Timothy R. Rabel, 1993 John Marshall National Moot Court Competition in
Information and Privacy Law., Bench Memorandum, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 627, 629-30 (1994). The moot court combatants also considered the issue of whether
TEMPEST assisted surveillance violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.
Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848). Under the fictional posture of this case, the
petitioner brought the statutory violation and intrusion claims in circuit court, both of which
were dismissed on respondent's motion for failure to state a claim. Id. The petitioner ap-
pealed to the appellate court, which affirmed the decision below. Id. at 630-31. The case was
then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Marshall. Id. at 631.
124. For a discussion about TEMPEST technology, see supra Part III.C.2.c.
125. See Rabel, supra note 123, at 627-29.
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copy customer names and addresses that had appeared on the screen.' 6
This surveillance occurred over a period of twenty-three days.'2
The first part of the petitioner's argument, that respondent's conduct
constituted an actionable intrusion, focused on the Restatement princi-
ple that a physical invasion or technical trespass should not be required
for the purpose of establishing liability.'2 To this end, the petitioner
also discussed the shift in America's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
from a property-based notion of privacy to one based on reasonable ex-
pectations.'29 The petitioner then cited the case of Pearson v. Dodd, for
the proposition that "[tihe common law, like the Fourth Amendment,
should 'protect people, not places.""
In the second part of its argument, the petitioner relied on the Nader
case for its position that the essential question was whether [the] peti-
tioner had a reasonable expectation that his mailing list would remain
confidential. 3' The petitioner then argued that it had such an expecta-
tion because "a reasonable person would not expect that the impulses of
light from his video display terminal could go through solid walls and be
intercepted... ,132 The petitioner concluded by arguing that the re-
spondent's conduct in defeating that expectation was unreasonably in-
trusive and, therefore, actionable.'
The respondent conceded that "[a] number of courts have dispensed
with the requirement that an intrusion plaintiff must show a physical
trespatory invasion,"' 4 but noted that many cases still look for the "utili-
126. See id. at 629.
127. See id.
128. See Marie-Louise R. Samuels et al., 1993 John Marshall National Moot Court
Competition in Information and Privacy Law: Brief for the Petitioner, 12 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 645,667-69 (1994).
129. See Samuels, supra note 128, at 669-70 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886)).
130. ld. at 671 (quoting Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). The petitioner
failed, however, to note the fact that Dean Prosser, in his original articulation of the intrusion
tort, used a similar two-prong analysis-seven years before the Katz decision. See Prosser,
supra note 9.
131. See Samuels, supra note 128, at 673 (citing Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255
N.E.2d 765,770).
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Spiro P. Fotopoulos et al., 1993 John Marshall National Moot Court Competition in
Information and Privacy Law: Brief for the Respondent, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 679,702 (1994).
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zation of an intruding or prying device.""'b The respondent then argued
that the CRT Microspy was not such a device, because "[i]nstead of
prying into the sights or sounds of a person's private world, the CRT
Microspy picks up the signals that another person is freely projecting...
,136 As such, the respondent concluded that the petitioner's claim was
not actionable.
The respondent's argument is very persuasive, making it appear as if
Hackner's actions were nothing more than what Sherlock Holmes does
when he views a person: simply discerning facts from information that
people reveal unwittingly. As previously mentioned, it would make no
difference for the purpose of fixing liability for intrusion that Holmes
was especially perceptive-discerning where others merely appreci-
ated-because he was properly in a position to appreciate that from
which he discerned some fact.7 The rationale for this outcome is that it
would "place too great a strain on human weakness" of a casual viewer
or listener to require him to "play the nobler part and shut his [eyes or
ears]" to readily discernible facts.m However, upon closer examination,
it is clear that this rationale does not support the respondent's conten-
tion in this fictitious case.
Unlike Sherlock Holmes, the respondent in this fictitious case em-
ployed an artificial sense. Sherlock Holmes' powers of observation are
natural, therefore it would indeed be a strain on his "human weakness"
to require him to keep it in check by consciously disregarding readily
discernible facts. On the other hand, one has total control over whether
or not to employ an artificial sense. Therefore, it does not offend the
general principle of intrusion law to impose liability for the use of such
devices. However, time will only tell if this reasoning will find accep-
tance in the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The tort of intrusion is most properly viewed in terms of the four dis-
tinct categories of intrusion originally contemplated by the Restatement
definition: (1) those involving some trespass to land; (2) those involving
some trespass to chattels; (3) those solely involving the use of the senses;
135. Id.
136. Id at 703.
137. See supra Part II.B.
138. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701,705 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (declining to extend liability for
intrusion upon seclusion to the passive recipient of information known to have been gathered
through eavesdropping).
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and (4) those involving some form of harassment. This third category,
as we have seen, can be divided into three distinct sub-categories of sen-
sory intrusion: (1) those using the natural senses; (2) those using sen-
sory enhancement devices; and (3) those using artificial senses.
By keeping these intrusions separate and distinct from one another,
courts will be better able to adopt and apply varying standards for as-
sessing the actionability of the different categories of intrusion-both in
terms of "expectation of privacy" and offensiveness. Due to the ability
of modem surveillance devices to both collapse and expand the notions
of appreciating and discerning, and do so in a most unobtrusive manner,
such varying standards will be necessary if claims of invasion of privacy
by mechanical means are to remain viable.
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